Kingdom Ethics & Immigration: Responding as Christians to the Current Immigration Crisis

By Miles Williams

BA--History & Political Science; Philosophy (Greenville College)

Graduate Student--Political Science (Eastern Illinois University)

What follows is based on my undergraduate honors thesis.  This is a much shorter version (though be advised it is still very long for a blog).  I've tidied things up, eliminated certain parts, and tried to retain what I thought were some of the most salient elements.  I've divided this article into four parts.  The first offers a very brief history of immigration in the US.  The second delves into many of the problems with the current immigration system.  The third makes a normative case for why Christians ought to respond to the immigration crisis as Christians, and it lays out a conceptual framework for what responding "as Christians" means.  The fourth offers concluding remarks. (*I apologize for any formatting errors*)

I. The Historical Roots of the Immigration Crisis

Throughout the history of the United States, various laws have formed American immigration policy and often have resulted from a recurring tug-o-war between economic and nativistic concerns, which have always been connected to a larger, global context of international migrations and political, social, and economic conditions in other countries (Carroll R., 5-6).  On the one hand, economic factors, such as a lack of employment opportunities in people’s countries of origin, have tended to push people away from their native countries into the United States where labor needs in business, industry, and agriculture have tended to pull in foreign workers (Carroll R., 6).  On the other hand, many native-born Americans have responded negatively to these large influxes of foreign laborers.  At various times, depending upon the circumstances, nativism has arisen in response to immigration for religious reasons, out of fear or ignorance of foreign customs, racism, lack of education, and competition for jobs during periods of economic downturn (Carroll R., 7).  Regardless of the domestic concerns historically expressed by Americans, immigration has always been related to a complex array of factors that often fall outside the national government’s ability to regulate.  The current pattern of northward migration by Mexicans and Latin Americans is inextricably connected to such factors.

The Nativism of a Nation of Immigrants

Matthew Soerens and Jenny Hwang, using historian Roger Daniels, argue that the nativism felt by Americans during various periods often has come in the form of a double standard, with Americans “‘on the one hand reveling in the nation’s immigrant past and on the other rejecting much of its immigrant present’” (qtd. in Soerens & Hwang, 47).  According to Ben Daniel, Bill Bryson makes a similar observation in his book Made in America:

If one attitude can be said to characterize America’s regard for immigration over the past two hundred years it is the belief that while immigration was unquestionably a wise and prescient thing in the case of one’s parents or grandparents, it really ought to stop now. For two hundred years succeeding generations of Americans have persuaded themselves that the country faced imminent social dislocation, and eventual ruin, at the hands of the grasping foreign hordes pouring through her ports (37). 

The Beginnings of Regulation

Federal oversight of immigration did not officially begin until Congress passed the Immigration Act in 1882, which required every noncitizen that arrived at a U.S. port to pay a fee that would go to the Treasury Department to regulate immigration (Hipsman & Meissner, n.p.).  Under this law, immigrants were further required to undergo a screening process whereby those declared to be “a ‘convict, lunatic, idiot, or person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge’” were bared entry (Hipsman & Meissman, n.p.).   Congress also passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, the first of many legislative measures intended to curtail the immigration of various racial groups (Hipsman & Meissman, n.p.).  Under this law, Chinese immigration was halted for 10 years, Chinese immigrants were prevented from naturalizing, and anyone of Chinese origin living in the U.S. without proper paperwork could be deported (Hipsman & Meissman, n.p.). 

Despite the restrictions this law placed on Chinese immigration, the flow of Chinese immigrants did not stop, and, in fact, many created falsified birth certificates to make it look as though they had been born in the United States (Soerens & Hwang, 55).  The fact that Chinese immigrants created falsified documents and resided in the United States illegally has significance for the current debate surrounding the presence of millions of undocumented Mexican and Latin American immigrants residing within America’s borders.  Soerens and Hwang cite attorney and activist Fred Tsao, who argues that the “phenomenon” of illegal immigration reveals that “‘if you set up restrictions…particularly restrictions on established patterns of immigration, you’ll find [that] people will find ways to get around them’” (55).  Though it is not the case that restrictions never work, if the restrictions put in place fail to account for the underlying economic, social, and cultural factors driving a given pattern of immigration, they will be hard to enforce.

Chinese immigrants began flocking to the United States in the 1850s following the discovery of gold in California in 1848 (Hipsman & Meissman, n.p.).  However, in the latter part of the 19th century, the mining boom that had attracted many Chinese workers to America’s west began to wane, and this waning in the mining industry correlated with mounting distrust and animosity toward Chinese workers and other foreigners (Hipsman & Meissman, n.p.).  Nevertheless, by the time the Chinese Exclusion Act had been passed, Chinese immigration had already become an “established pattern of immigration.”  The current situation facing U.S. policy makers regarding the large undocumented Hispanic population residing within America’s borders reflects a similar scenario:  people are finding ways to get around laws that restrict an established pattern of immigration.    

Immigration Today

The most recent, and current, period of large-scale immigration to the United States began in the 1970s, when the U.S. began shifting from an industry-based economy to a knowledge-based economy (see table 1) (Hipsman & Meissman, n.p.).  Mexico is currently the chief contributing source of immigration, both in terms of authorized and unauthorized immigration (Hipsman & Meissman, n.p.).  According to a 2013 study from the American Community Survey, about 11.6 million, or about 28 percent of all U.S. immigrants, are from Mexico (Zong & Batalova, n.p.).  As of 2013, there were in total over 40 million immigrants living in the United States, of which an estimated 11.4 million lacked proper documentation (i.e., a valid or unexpired visa, or a green card) (Zong & Batalova, n.p.).  Of these 11.4 million unauthorized immigrants, the Migration Policy Institute estimates that between 2008 and 2012, 71 percent were born in Mexico and Central America, 13 percent were born in Asia, 7 percent were born in South America, and 2 percent were from the Caribbean (Zong & Batalova, n.p.).  The current pattern of immigration, both authorized and unauthorized, is clearly marked by the northward immigration of Mexicans.  

The Economy of Border Control

M. Daniel Carroll R. suggests that Hispanic immigration did not technically begin until 1848 following the end of the Mexican-American War (9).  As a result of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, nearly half of Mexico’s territory (California, Nevada, Utah, parts of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Wyoming) was ceded to the United States (Carroll R., 9).  With this cession of territory came nearly 100,000 foreign-born individuals who all became U.S. citizens in a single day (Soerens & Hwang, 52).  However, it was not until the 1890s, following the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act that restricted the immigration of Chinese workers, that significant numbers of immigrants began crossing the United States’ southern border (Carroll R., 9). 

With prohibitions against Chinese workers, agriculture and industry looked south of the border for new laborers—an event which Carroll R. describes as ironic given that “the exclusion of one immigrant people opened the door to another” (9).  This pattern of northward migration from Mexico continued following the outbreak of World War I (Carroll R., 9).  As young American men joined the armed forces to fight a war in Europe, jobs in agriculture and industry went unfilled, attracting Mexican workers north to take these jobs (Carroll R., 9-10).  The northward migration of Mexicans was further fueled by unstable economic and political conditions in Mexico during the latter part of the 19th century and early part of the 20th century (Carroll R., 10).  The flow of Mexican immigrants remained relatively strong until the stock market crash in 1929 and the subsequent depression (Carroll R., 10).  However, Mexican immigration, once again, rose during World War II when, as during the First World War, many American men left their domestic jobs to join the armed forces, leaving a void, particularly in agricultural jobs, that needed to be filled by migrant workers (Soerens & Hwang, 59).  In 1942, in an effort to fill many of these jobs, the American and Mexican governments worked together to establish the bracero program, a guest worker program that allowed Mexican agricultural laborers temporary non-immigrant status to work in America’s agriculture industry (Soerens & Hwang, 59).  Despite resistance from organized labor groups who argued that these immigrant workers were taking American jobs, and from others who worried Mexican laborers were being exploited, the bracero program remained in effect until 1964 (Soerens & Hwang, 59).  

The Post-Reform Period

Reforms to immigration law in 1965, excepting several modifications, have since been the model after which immigration legislation from 1965 to present has been based (Soerens & Hwang, 62).  Though many of the changes made in 1965 solved some of the problems associated with the nationality-based quota system, which had been put in place in 1924 to restrict immigration from eastern and southern Europe, it created several new problems that still befall America today (Soerens & Hwang, 62).  More specifically, while the 1965 legislation opened America’s doors to Asians, Africans, and other non-European groups who had previously been denied entry, it put new restrictions and numerical limits on Mexican and Latin American immigrants who, up to that point, had entered the United States without having to worry about extensive legal barriers (Soerens & Hwang, 62).  

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, border security has changed substantially (Carroll R., 15).  In 2002, the Department of Homeland Security was established, and in 2003 it absorbed the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Carroll R., 15).  Both the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Border Patrol fell under the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency, which is a bureau of the Department of Homeland Security (Carroll R., 15).  Concern for border security has since been a chief priority for many Americans who worry that an insecure border will fail to keep terrorists and various criminals from entering the country.  

The Christian Response

It has not only been Americans at large who have maintained differing opinions of immigrants throughout U.S. history.  American Christians, too, have held differing and changing views of immigrants (Soerens & Hwang, 60).  Though the church, particularly the Protestant church, has not been without its prejudices, by the 1920s, many Protestants began to advocate against nationality-based restrictions on immigration (Soerens & Hwang, 61).  This change, suggests Lawrence B. Hays, likely resulted from personal contact with often “vilified” immigrants (Soerens & Hwang, 60).  Soerens and Hwang indicate the change came about as Christians “heeded the call” of evangelical leaders such as Howard Grose, who in a series of popular books, extolled the arrival of the “incoming millions” as “an opportunity” to “carry the gospel to [foreigners] in our own land” (60).  Though these Christian voices have had a significant impact on U.S. policy toward immigrants, there has been, as yet, no unified Christian voice.  Moreover, the lack of a unified national opinion on immigrants in general has only exacerbated the issue. 

Historical Generalizations

Continual tension between international economic “push” and “pull” factors (push factors being disincentives that “push” people to leave an economic environment; pull factors being incentives that “pull” people toward an economic environment) and domestic, nativistic backlashes, which is a tension demonstrated by the history of Mexican immigration to the United States, has had a notably negative effect on the consistency of immigration law.  As M. Daniel Carroll R. states:  

During the past 150 years the multiple conflicts between economic demands at home and abroad, popular opposition, the attitudes of organized labor, foreign policy, and the agendas of political parties have yielded a legacy of contradictory regulations and inconsistent enforcement. Confusing compromises and legal irregularities have reigned as politicians have sought to satisfy opposing constituencies (7). 

Many of the current problems created by immigration legislation currently in place have resulted from this pattern of “confusing compromises and legal irregularities.” 

II. Problems with Current Immigration Law

Soerens and Hwang indicate that a significant point of confusion for American citizens “is why illegal immigration has become so common” (64).  It seems reasonable to expect people to immigrate to the United States through the proper channels, but such an expectation is founded upon misconceptions about how the immigration process works.  The current system is inefficient, expensive, and backlogged—in some cases for decades.  The presence of millions of undocumented immigrants residing in the United States is inextricably linked to the inadequacies of the current system. 

Who are the “Undocumented?”

Before going further, it is first necessary to define what makes an immigrant “undocumented.”  An undocumented immigrant is anyone residing in the U.S. who has either overstayed a temporary nonimmigrant visa (given to tourists, business travelers, temporary workers, and students), lacks lawful permanent resident status (a “green card” that shows a resident has permission to live and work in the U.S. permanently), or lacks U.S. citizenship (which requires that the resident has first obtained lawful permanent resident status and has lived in the U.S. for five years, passed a test, and demonstrated that they are of “good moral character”) (Soerens & Hwang, 66-69). 

Setting the Record Straight

Many assume laziness and stinginess on the part of immigrants who come to the U.S. via unauthorized means.  Those who hold this view think that undocumented immigrants refuse to get proper paperwork so that they can avoid paying taxes, because they are too lazy to fill out the required paperwork, or are “too impatient to wait their turn in line” (Soerens & Hwang, 64-65).  These assumptions are based upon several misunderstandings about the character of immigrants and the nature of what “waiting in line” actually entails. 

Most immigrants desire to have proper documentation, but the current system leaves them little, if any, means for obtaining the necessary paperwork (Soerens & Hwang, 65).  Moreover, there is no actual line in which immigrants can wait to enter the United States.  The current system requires immigrants to pay a substantial fee ($500) to apply for a visa at the U.S. consulate in their native country, but many lack the financial resources to do so and are forced to leave the consulate having gotten no closer to legally entering the United States (Soerens & Hwang, 66). 

There are four pathways leading to lawful residence:  family-based immigration, employment-based immigration, diversity immigration, and refugees/asylum (Soerens & Hwang, 71-78).  Employment-based and family-based immigration are particularly relevant to the current debate surrounding immigration (Bergeron, 1).  The family-based pathway allows U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents to petition for green cards to be given to close family members, while the employment-based pathway allows employers to petition for migrant workers who can then apply for permanent resident status (Bergeron, 1). 

For the family-based channel, there are six categories of noncitizens that can apply for permanent residence:  1) immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, which include spouses, minor children, and parents of citizens 21 years of age or older; 2) 1st preference, which includes unmarried adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens; 3) 2A preference, which includes spouses and minor children of lawful permanent residents; 4) 2B preference, which includes unmarried adult sons and daughters of lawful permanent residents; 5) 3rd preference, which includes married adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens; 6) 4th preference, which includes siblings of U.S. citizens who are 21 years of age or older (Bergeron, 2).  For the above categories, there is no annual cap on the first, there is a 23,400 annual cap on the second, a shared 114,200 annual cap for the third and fourth, a 23,400 annual cap for the fifth, and a 65,000 annual cap on the sixth (Bergeron, 2). 

For the employment-based channel, there are five categories of noncitizens that can apply for permanent residence:  1) 1st preference, which includes foreign nationals of “extraordinary ability,” professors and researchers, and multinational executives and managers; 2) 2nd preference, which includes foreign nationals with advanced degrees or who have exceptional abilities in the sciences, arts, or business; 3) 3rd preference, which includes skilled laborers, professionals, and other works; 4) 4th preference, which includes Afghan/Iraqi translators, employees of international organizations, and religious workers; 5) 5th preference, which includes migrant investors (Bergeron, 2).  For the first category there is an annual cap of 40,040 migrants, for the second a 40,040 annual cap, for the third a 40,040 annual cap with not more than 10,000 available for those classified as “other workers,” for the fourth category there is an annual cap of 9,940, and for the fifth a 9,940 annual cap (Bergeron, 2).

Flaws in the System

The process of filing for permanent residence requires first that a family member or employer petitions for the government to issue a visa for someone to enter the U.S. (Bergeron, 3).  Once the visa is issued, the prospective immigrant is notified and then must apply for legal permanent resident status (Bergeron, 3).  While this process seems simple enough, the primary problem with it is that there is an extended waiting period—which can last up to two decades—between step one and step two (Bergeron, 3-4). 

Long wait times result from limits in immigration law that are incongruous with the demand to immigrate.  The problem is twofold:  first, the demand for immigrant visas is much higher than the annual caps placed on immigration and, second, the per-country limit of 7 percent of the worldwide ceiling for the number of people from a given country that can earn legal resident status per year—which was instituted to prevent unfair preference for immigration from certain countries—fails to account the uneven demand for legal resident status per country (Bergeron, 4).  In the case of the first, years of oversubscription have resulted in prolonged backlogs (Bergeron, 4).  In the case of the second, uneven demand per country has resulted in exceptionally long wait times for those countries with the highest demand for family-based and employment-based visas (Bergeron, 4).  Oversubscription from Mexico, for example, for most family-based channels is backlogged by almost two decades according to data from the U.S. visa bulletin for March 2015 (U.S. Department of State – Bureau of Consular Affairs, n.p.).  As of 2013, applications for permanent resident status were backlogged by 4.4 million, and given the current numerical limits created by immigration law it could take roughly 19 years—not counting delays created by per-country limits—to resolve this backlog (Bergeron, 7). 

Another flaw with current immigration law is discussed by Papademetriou and associates, who note the current system sets static limits on employment-based immigration that fail to contend with changes in yearly market demands businesses have for immigrant workers (1).  They suggest that a major weakness of the current system is that it lacks a provisional visa program that would allow employer needs to be more fully met while simultaneously protecting U.S. worker interests and promoting pro-integration values for all Americans (Papademetriou et al., 1).  Unfortunately, as Papademetriou and his colleagues indicate:

The current visa system, which owes its basic architecture to the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, is far too rigid in setting conditions for immigrant recruitment.  Most employers seeking to hire a permanent immigrant or a low-skilled temporary worker must painstakingly document their inability to hire a native worker.  Many employers of high-skilled temporary workers must commit to specific employment conditions before petitioning for the immigrant’s admission.  And the most important visa categories, both permanent and temporary, confront strict numerical limits. 

Such restrictions have produced wait times of up to six years for some employment-based green cards (i.e. visas authorizing lawful permanent residency), and a scramble to apply for scarce nonimmigrant visas, which in recent years have been exhausted within days or hours of the new fiscal year (2). 

Given the long wait times and the overall inability of the current immigration system to contend with current patterns of immigration, the existence of millions of undocumented immigrants within America’s borders seems not only understandable, but also inevitable.  The state of the current system makes complaints against undocumented immigrants for their failure “to go to the back of the line” seem at best dubious, and at worst unreasonable and cruel.  And he problem is only compounded by the nature of immigration enforcement. 

Conflicting Enforcement Policy Goals

One of the biggest dilemmas facing policy makers is how to reconcile tough and humane enforcement in immigration law.  Rosenblum and associates indicate that the problem of enforcement results from differences in policy at the border versus how immigration law is enforced within the country (1).  They indicate that three factors have driven deportation policies for the past two decades:  1) the passage of laws expanding the grounds for deportation; 2) increases in the number of immigration enforcement personnel and resources; 3) the policy decisions of the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations (1). 

Rosenblum et al. note that the Obama administration expanded upon the already unprecedented capacity created during previous administrations to identify, apprehend, and deport undocumented immigrants (1).  For example, under the Bush administration over 1.9 million undocumented immigrants were deported over the course of eight years (Rosenblum et al., 1).  Under the Obama administration, nearly 2.0 million undocumented immigrants were deported over the course of just five years (Rosenblum et al., 1). 

However, while the scope of enforcement has grown substantially, the current administration has instituted “prosecutorial discretion policies” that allow enforcement efforts to be more focused (Rosenblum et al., 1).  Under these policies, enforcement personnel are given guidelines against deporting certain people that fall outside particular priority categories (Rosenblum et al., 1). 

Even so, the result of the Obama administration’s current policies have led to

sharply different enforcement pictures at the border and within the United States.  At the border, there is a zero-tolerance system, where unauthorized immigrants are increasingly subject to formal removal and criminal charges.  Within the country, there is greater flexibility, with priorities and resources focused on a smaller share of the population subject to removal.  Such differences are consistent with the different goals and circumstances confronting border and interior enforcement.  But the impacts of these differing systems have begun to converge, raising increasingly complex questions and choices for policymakers and the public (Rosenblum et al., 1). 

The chief concern expressed by immigrant advocates and also the current administration is how to keep an upscale in enforcement simultaneously humane, and many have called for the Department of Homeland Security to either scale back or entirely suspend deportations until much needed immigration reforms can be passed (Rosenblum et al., 1).  However, those in favor of stricter immigration enforcement have accused the Obama administration of failing to sufficiently uphold the rule of law in response to undocumented immigration (Rosenblum et al., 2).  The current system is thus unsatisfactory for people on both sides of the debate.

Casualties in the Crossfire

The impact that the current system of enforcement has on immigrant and U.S. citizen families is less than ideal.  Many of the undocumented immigrants that have been deported since 2009 have deep roots in the United States, and as a result their deportation has affected the lives of many immigrants and U.S. citizens (Rosenblum et al., 6).  According to the Department of Homeland Security, in January 2011 nearly 86 percent of the undocumented population in the U.S. had been living in the country for six or more years (Hoefer et al., 3).  Moreover, an estimated 46 percent of unauthorized immigrant adults are parents of minor children; while 38 percent and 29 percent of authorized immigrants and U.S. citizens, respectively, are parents of minor children (Taylor et al., 5).  Also, according to a 2013 survey, 94 percent of unauthorized immigrants have at least one family member living in the United States, and other research indicates that almost 74 percent of unauthorized immigrants are in the U.S. workforce (Rosenblum et al., 6).  Regarding the number of undocumented immigrants in federal prisons, in 2010, 29 percent of those incarcerated were convicted of illegal reentry (Schulkin, n.p.).  In 2011, 391,953 deportations were reported, of which 203,571 (almost 51 percent) were not “criminal aliens,” but rather were recent or repeat immigration violators (Schulkin, n.p.).  Such statistics show that there are significant ripple effects—many potentially negative—associated with deportations for U.S.-based immigrant communities and nonimmigrant communities alike (Rosenblum et al., 6).

It is further questionable as to whether stricter enforcement, particularly at the border, is either effective or humane.  Soerens and Hwang indicate that, because of the increase in border patrols, many immigrants are crossing the border further into the dessert with the consequence that an estimated three thousand have died in the past decade trying to cross the border (Soerens & Hwang, 111).  Of course, as Soerens and Hwang explain, “[s]tronger border security measures…are not inconsistent with a more generous immigration policy” (110).  However, stronger border security, to be effective, must be accompanied by the creation of “responsive legal avenues through which people can migrate back and forth…in an orderly system” (Soerens & Hwang, 111).  As Ben Daniel critically states regarding enforcement-only approaches, such as the construction of a border fence:

The border fence is a ridiculous waste of money and, often, a tragic waste of human life.  The wall doesn’t keep people out of the United States; it just encourages people to cross the border in increasingly dangerous places.  Besides, as expensive as walls and fences are to build and maintain, ladders are cheap.  The only people who benefit from the wall are politicians whose constituents like easy answers to complex issues (xx). 

While it is worth considering whether Daniel unfairly caricatures American politicians, Daniel’s critique echoes Soerens and Hwang’s concern that “we should recognize that our complex and inadequate immigration system has made it impossible for many of the hard-working people that our country needs to enter or remain in the country legally or to be reunited with family members” (111). 

No Easy Solutions

One of the greatest difficulties in addressing the many problems with immigration law is the disagreement between pro-immigrant and pro-enforcement advocates.  On the one hand, the presence of a large undocumented population in the U.S. is a mockery of the rule of law; on the other hand, the current system in place is invariably flawed and unsuited to current patterns of immigration.  In a way, the current system is a mockery of the realities of immigration.  While a solution is not entirely clear, it is undeniable that reform is desperately needed.  The family-based and employment-based channels to permanent resident status are hopelessly backlogged, and the current system of enforcement has negative ripple effects for immigrant and nonimmigrant families alike.  By most accounts, the current immigration dilemma is caused by the inadequate structures put in place to regulate and enforce immigration.

The reality of immigration law makes relevant the claim Mark Adams makes in Bishops at the Border: 

the border reality has given greater insight into what the Scripture means when it says ‘our struggle is not against flesh and blood but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the cosmic powers of this present darkness, against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly places” (xiv).

This issue, especially for Christians, is not about attending to the needs of one group against another (U.S. citizens versus undocumented immigrants), but it is about addressing the systems in place that divide people groups and make life difficult for all people.

III. Ecclesial Solidarity and Undocumented Immigration

For Christians, in contemplating a response to undocumented immigration, the chief challenge, beyond that of finding a solution that works, is to define a singular lens or approach on which all, or most, Christians can agree.  It is this very challenge that M. Daniel Carroll R. addresses in his book Christians at the Border.  For Carroll R. the solution is relatively simple; though the question of how easy this solution will be to implement is another matter entirely.  He spends a great deal of time in his book providing both Old and New Testament guidance on how Christians should respond to foreigners, doing so with the intent to offer “a biblical and theological framework from which Christians, as Christians, might participate in the ongoing debate” (130).  Carroll R. emphasizes the provision of a Christian framework because he is convinced that the reason Christians have trouble agreeing on a solution has less to do with arguments about Scripture and more to do with differences in ideological and political commitments and backgrounds (130).  In other words, Carroll R. argues that disagreement amongst Christians exists because many have failed to approach this issue as Christians and have instead chosen to approach it as either nativists or free-market thinkers, as fearful citizens or human rights activists, or as low-skill laborers and union members or those pursuing agricultural and business interests (129).  In order for Christians to establish a unified goal, they must start by establishing a common lens through which to view the current situation.

Baptism without Borders

Aside from the fact that Christians have historically disagreed on how to interpret Scripture for two millennia, Carroll R. does make a convincing case for why a Christian response to immigration can potentially be a unified one, at least in terms of establishing a goal or guiding principle.  Carroll R. would agree with Soerens and Hwang, who state that “Scripture makes clear that immigrants are to be specifically included in the call to love our neighbors as ourselves” (186).  The goal therefore for Christians, apart from specific means, is very simply to find ways to reflect God’s love and justice to immigrants.  The achievement of this goal requires a twofold commitment, both to Scripture and to “ecclesial solidarity.” 

The latter of these commitments is addressed by Michael L. Budde in his book The Borders of Baptism.  For Budde, ecclesial solidarity entails that Christians are to see themselves as a part of a global community of believers first and foremost, and it is through this sense of solidarity that they are to contextualize other claimants on their allegiance such as nationality, political ideology, and social class.  As Budde states: 

Ecclesial solidarity means that the welfare of one’s brothers and sisters in Christ makes special claims on one’s affections, resources, and priorities.  It means that the unity of the churches in visible and tangible ways is a key expression of Christian conviction and vocation, even in the face of centrifugal pressures and the demands of lesser, more partial communities and ideologies.  It means that processes of Christian discernment and worship cross the divides of patriotism and other types of tribalism, making one’s coreligionists the “to whom” we owe service, love and mutual support (3). 

Ecclesial solidarity, though it entails a clear sense of loyalty shared by Christians globally, does not entail that Christians should disregard any loyalty and love owed to their immediate neighbors—nor does it imply that Christians should disregard those outside the church.  Rather, ecclesial solidarity is, in many ways, expressed by showing love and affection for all who are immediately at hand and also abroad.  As Lohfink states in his book Jesus and Community: 

In a very realistic manner [early Christians] sought to achieve fraternal love within their own ranks and constantly made simultaneous efforts to transcend their boundaries.  In this fashion an ever increasing number of people was drawn into the fraternity of the church, and new neighborly relations became possible (qtd. in Budde, 7).  

In almost direct opposition claims that there is a Scriptural foundation for prioritizing one’s concern for one’s immediate neighbors (see, for example, Edwards, James.  “Testimony of James R. Edwards, Jr., Ph.D. Before the House Immigration Subcommittee on ‘Ethical Imperative for Immigration Reform.’”  judiciary.house.gov. 14 July 2010.  Web.  2 December 2015.; and Edwards, James.  “Seeking Biblical Principles to Inform Immigration Policy.”  Christianity Today.  20 September 2006.  Web.  18 May 2015.), Budde is convinced that local commitments to ecclesial solidarity only proscribe “Christians from harming their non-local relatives on the assumption that one’s neighbors always and inevitably present claims on Christian allegiance, priorities, and actions” (3-4).  According to Budde, ecclesial solidarity should instill a greater sense of “‘E pluribus unum’” amongst Christians than should any other sort of solidarity, while it simultaneously should not destroy the uniqueness and integrity of the local church (4).  For Budde, there is no reason to pit American poor against foreign poor as if both groups were enemies of each other.  In light of ecclesial solidarity, the distinction between American and non-American is only an impediment to Christian love and action.  As the late Pope John Paul II, who would likely agree with this assessment of ecclesial solidarity’s ramifications, stated:

Solidarity means taking responsibility for those in trouble.  For Christians, the migrant is not merely an individual to be respected in accordance with the norms established by law, but a person whose presence challenges them and whose needs become an obligation for their responsibility.  “What have you done to your brother?” (Cf. Gen. 4:9).  The answer should not be limited to what is imposed by law, but should be made in the manner of solidarity. 

…It is the Church’s task not only to present constantly the Lord’s teaching of faith, but also to indicate its appropriate application to the various situations which the changing times continue to create.  Today the illegal migrant comes before us like that “stranger” in whom Jesus asks to be recognized.  To welcome him and to show him solidarity is a duty of hospitality and fidelity to Christian identity itself (qtd. in Daniel, 34-35). 

What is at stake here for Budde is not to be lightly taken.  In what may be regarded as his central thesis, Budde states:

My argument is that the revitalization and reform of Christianity now and in the future will be both incomplete and doomed to irrelevance until it reclaims the integrity and distinctiveness of the Church.  Unless the borders of baptism become capable of defining a people that “seek first the Kingdom of God,” that sees itself as God’s imperfect prototype for reconciled human unity in diversity…, Christianity will continue its rapid descent into a parody of its calling and vocation (11).

In other words, there can be no distinct Christian response to immigration unless there exists a truly Christian group of people who are distinct from other groups and unified in their identity as a people who seek, first and foremost, the Kingdom of God.  Budde’s chief concern is that a strong sense of Christian identity, one that transcends local and national allegiances, has heretofore been lacking in the church globally.  This concern reflects Carroll R.’s concern that Christians have primarily approached immigration from secular, rather than sacred, lenses—that is, as Americans; not Christians.

Sacrality without Borders

It should be noted that the contrast between sacred and secular is perhaps an inaccurate portrayal of what is going on when Christians choose to approach the immigration issue from the context of nationalistic, economic, or activist varieties of solidarity, which are typically regarded as secular, as opposed to ecclesial solidarity, which might be thought of as sacred.  This problem is addressed by William T. Cavanaugh in his book Migrations of the Holy.  In his chapter entitled “The Liturgies of Church and State,” Cavanaugh argues that the sacred/secular distinction is a mistaken one (115).  He states:

Today the most significant misunderstanding of the Christian liturgy is that it is sacred.  Let me clarify.  The problem is that “sacred” has been opposed to “secular,” and the two are presumed to describe two separate—but occasionally related—orbits.  The problem is not simply that this separation leaves the church’s liturgy begging for relevance to the “real world.”  The problem is, further, that the supposedly “secular” world invents its own liturgies, with pretensions every bit as “sacred” as those of the Christian liturgy, and these liturgies can come to rival the church’s liturgy for our bodies and our minds (115). 

For Cavanaugh, the term “liturgy” refers to actions that serve to form a distinctive group out of a previously disorganized “collection of individuals” (115-116).  Liturgy shapes people’s imaginations in ways that cause them to see themselves as members of a larger “political community.”  This political community is, however, an “imagined” one.  Cavanaugh cites Benedict Anderson, who argues community “‘is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’” (117). 

The method for forming these imagined communities is ritual action.  Cavanaugh points to what Carlton Hayes says in his Essays on Nationalism about the sorts of national rituals that effectively create a sense of American identity and community.  Hayes observes:

Curious liturgical forms have been devised for “saluting” the flag, for “dipping” the flag, for “lowering” the flag, for “hoisting” the flag.  Men bare their heads when the flag passes by; and in praise of the flag poets write odes and children sing hymns.  In America young people are ranged in serried rows and required to recite daily, with hierophantic voice and ritualistic gesture, the mystical formula:  “I pledge allegiance to the flag and to the country for which it stands, one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.”  Everywhere, in all solemn feasts and fasts of nationalism the flag is evidence, and with it that other sacred thing, the national anthem (qtd. in Cavanaugh, 118-119). 

Such national liturgies, though rarely called “sacred” by Americans, have a remarkably religious tinge to them.  Evidence, or the “crucial test,” for the religious nature of American liturgy for Cavanaugh is “what people do with their bodies, both in liturgy and in war” (119).  That Christians in the United States regard killing and dying in war for the United States—as opposed to the Christian God—as an occasionally justified act of “‘ultimate sacrifice’ for the nation,” is evidence enough for Cavanaugh to suggest that, wittingly or not, many American Christians participate in a distinct “American civil religion” (118-119). 

Regardless of whether this proposed American civil religion is malignant or benign, what results from this understanding of liturgical and communal identity is the breakdown of any distinction between sacred and secular, which is a distinction that has been used to effectively separate notions of private faith from public action.  For Cavanaugh, liturgy is a way of guiding the movement of bodies, and it is a participation in a way of life (119).  How one behaves is inextricably linked to the community with which one identifies, and communal identity is inextricably connected to the heart of one’s religious and moral convictions.  For this reason, Cavanaugh argues that 

we must look with a critical eye on liturgies that compete for our allegiance.  We must not quarantine the liturgy into a “sacred” space, but must allow it to shape the way we form our mundane communities, our goals, allegiances, and relationships (122). 

In light of Cavanaugh’s assessment of liturgy and its relationship to solidarity, Carroll R.’s worry that Christians often approach the subject of undocumented immigration through lenses other than theological and ecclesial ones is no trivial concern.  The manner in which Christians conduct themselves is, on a daily basis, a visible declaration of allegiance.  As Claiborne and Haw note in Jesus for President:  “‘We vote every day with our feet, our hands, our lips, and our wallets’” (qtd. in Budde, 105). 

That daily actions have the utmost religious significance has potentially positive ramifications for Christians, provided they can recognize what Ted Lewis notes in his book Electing Not to Vote:  “‘that [Christians’] choosing, binding, promising, pledging, and vowing energies are to be expressed for the sake of the ekklesia, the “called-out” community, and are not to be expressed for the upbuidling of a state, nation, or empire’” (qtd. in Budde, 105).  If a Christian response to immigration is to have the slightest possibility of becoming a reality, there must first be a sense of ecclesial solidarity that contextualizes for Christians national borders, political parties, economic and industrial interests, and national security; whereas such concerns should not define the boundaries of Christian allegiance. 

The Difficult Road Ahead

The difficulty of establishing a strong sense of worldwide Christian unity and liturgy should not be ignored.  Budde is careful to note that the challenges presented by an ever globalizing world counterintuitively do little to help the creation of ecclesial solidarity.  As Budde indicates: 

One of the paradoxes of globalization is that while it constructs new transnational identities and communities, it also stimulates movements that reassert (and redefine) identities and allegiances in opposition to the effects of globalization:  resurgent forms of nationalism, intensified ethnic/tribal identities, and separatist movements of various sorts (10).

For Budde, the odds are very much stacked against the church.  He remarks, rather pessimistically, that the end result of the confluence of competing claimants on allegiance have, up to now, only “spiritualized” and “sidelined” “bonds of baptism” “in favor of the blood-and-iron ties of patriotism and ethnonational solidarity, the dollars-and-cents sinews of capitalism, and the idolatry of modern and postmodern selves” (10).  Indeed, numerous liturgies compete every day for Christians’ allegiances. 

Differences between Christian denominations further make the creation of ecclesial solidarity difficult.  Budde notes that Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches are, in practice, divided into national churches that “sharply constrain the transnational qualities of each” (11).  Moreover, Protestantism and evangelicalism remain notably disconnected from transnationalism, while Anabaptists, though they maintain strong inter-congregational ties, have “theological and political dispositions typical of the bulk of American evangelicalism” (Budde, 12).  Budde states regarding this overview: 

the fashioning of a serious sense of baptism and ecclesial solidarity confronts obstacles in every branch of Christianity in the West.  In that sense, no existing tradition can feel satisfied that it has settled on an optimal set of practices and commitments, nor is there an existing template to be copied from one part of Christianity to the rest (12). 

The way out of this mess for Budde is the “revitalization” of “the integrity and distinctiveness of the Church” (11).  This solution would doubtlessly be encouraged by Cavanaugh, who argues that Christians should begin to take a renewed interest in ecclesial liturgies and formative actions that will serve to make Christians see themselves as members of a larger community of believers beyond the purview of their local churches and separate from the liturgies of nation and state.  Carroll R. would likely regard both ecclesial solidarity and liturgy as viable and important means for allowing American Christians to take notice of their membership in the larger community of believers, for as he notes:

Christians are to display the life of Jesus, and this requires acquiring a set of virtues, like peaceableness, kindness, hospitality, and patience.  Christians and the church need to be a certain kind of people with a particular way of looking at and living within society.  For the church to be the church requires training in these virtues, the nurturing of Christian tradition through Word and sacrament, and the continual practice of the virtues (133). 

To be trained in Christian virtues requires participation in a Christian liturgy that teaches Christians not only how to read and interpret Scripture with humility and wisdom, but such training also should teach Christians how to behave, both within and without the church, in accordance with the larger goal of pursuing the Kingdom of God.  As Carroll R. suggests:

The virtues are fundamental for a Christian approach to Hispanic immigration within the church and in the public square.  An appropriate response to the complicated situation in society will not come from detached, objective analysis, cost-benefit calculations, efficiency quotients, and cultural arguments.  The decisions that are made and courses of action that are recommended should be commensurate with the life of Jesus—his actions, his teaching, his cross.  Analysis and calculations are necessary, but they must be informed by more transcendent beliefs and other overriding life commitments (133). 

Carroll R. argues that the “overriding life commitment” of the church is “to be a haven for the stranger and a household of the faithful of all cultures” (135).  This commitment should be regarded as the fundamental assumption and chief goal for Christians as they both engage in the immigration debate and respond with action—legislative or otherwise. 

It should be mentioned that Carroll R., and also Budde and Cavanaugh, do not pretend that the pursuit of this Christian commitment will be easy; much to the contrary, many Christians will likely disagree over methodology since there is rarely ever a clear answer for how Christian practice should look in various circumstances.  Nevertheless, the goal for all Christians should be the same:  to never fail to love one’s neighbor as oneself. 

The potential for the creation of ecclesial solidarity, though its possibility remains uncertain, can be facilitated by opportunities afforded by the contemporary era (Budde, 12).  Budde highlights the following three factors as “conducive” to a greater expression of ecclesial solidarity in our time:

1) The increased salience of transnational consciousness and solidarity in other contexts affects popular assessments of what may be possible in an ecclesial context…2) The very notion of sovereignty is changing…as mobility and fluidity increasingly trump the traditional powers of states…3) The powerful tools of various transnationalizing forces—revolutions in communications, reduced costs of transportation and travel, large groups of people at home in more than one place and culture—are at the disposal of the Church in its work of the Kingdom (12-13).

It is difficult to affirm that ecclesial solidarity can be achieved soon, if ever, but as mass communication proliferates and crosses boundaries that were previously impenetrable, the creation of a transnational Christian identity is more possible now than it ever has been.  If a supranational sense of solidarity between Christians worldwide can be achieved, the potential for Christians to move beyond their nationalistic, political, economic, and tribalistic ideologies will become more than a far-flung hope and develop into a present reality.  Such solidarity will go a long way in guiding a fuller and more comprehensive Christian response to the immigration dilemma.

IV. Conclusion

Catholic Bishop Edward J. Slattery from Tulsa, Oklahoma offered the following prayer in a pastoral letter entitled “The Suffering Faces of the Poor Are the Suffering Faces of Christ”:

Oh Father of Mercy, Your Only begotten Son suffered the threats of Herod and the pain of exile though just a child.  Grant, we beseech you, courage and hope to immigrant families who sojourn in a land not their own and preserve them from every injustice.  By your grace may we live in this world, so as to give witness that our citizenship is in heaven and our native home is the Kingdom of your Son, who lives and reigns with You and the Holy Spirit, one God, forever and ever, Amen (16).

Bishop Slattery inserted this prayer into a letter he wrote in response to a law put in place in Oklahoma (HB 1804) that would make it a felony to knowingly transport undocumented immigrants and put in place new barriers to keep undocumented immigrants from being hired and receiving government services (Budde, 77).  This law would criminalize various ministries and programs that help the undocumented (Budde, 77).  As Slattery notes:

The basic intention of this law is to deny those who have entered our country illegally the right to work in Oklahoma and the right to find shelter for their families in our communities.  Thus they are forced to flee our state.  I believe that the right to earn one’s living and the right to shelter one’s family securely are basic human rights, the fundamental building blocks of a just society, and to deny these rights is immoral and unjust.  I also believe that since the intention of HB 1804 is immoral, when it is implemented, the effects will be an intolerable increase in the suffering endured by the families of illegal immigrants, plus the spiritual suffering of those who must enforce it (6). 

For Slattery, it is clear that “[o]ur faith calls us to serve those in need with the same prompt response and the same generous love that we would show Christ Himself were He to come before us sick or tired or in need” (14).  Yet, many Christians (almost half of all white evangelicals, mainline Protestants, and Catholics) think that offering assistance to undocumented immigrants should be criminalized, and nearly half of all white and black Americans think undocumented immigration represents a significant threat to America’s culture and values (Budde, 86).  Michael Budde thinks this disconnect between what our faith calls us to and how Christians actually think is a reflection of “a general failure of Christian formation” (88).  As he states:

One of the major ecclesiological imperatives of our time may in fact derive from this circumstance—a renewed emphasis on “converting the baptized,” if you will, a commitment to forming disciples rather than citizens, persons for whom “being a Christian” is the primary identity and loyalty that then orders and conditions lesser ones (88).

The greatest challenge to creating a Christian approach to undocumented immigration may in fact be Christians, many of whom sometimes place greater emphasis on their national identity rather than their spiritual identity.  The church can never fully be the hands and feet of Christ to undocumented immigrants and legal U.S. residents alike until it fully becomes Christ’s body, not just in abstraction, but also, and most importantly, in practice.  This essay covers many of the problems created by current immigration law, and it argues for an ecclesial approach, or way to view this issue, that paints the systems and laws that hurt and divide people as the enemies in the immigration debate rather than the hurt and divided people involved.  However, regardless of everything discussed up to now, we have now reached a point similar to that experienced by Mark Adams and his colleague Jesus Gallegos.  Near the end of a presentation they led for a men’s breakfast and prayer group in Loveland, Colorado on some of the travails experienced by people at the border, one of the men at the breakfast said:  “‘It’s well and good to talk about how bad things are, but you need to do something about it’” (xxxi-xxxii).  This challenge, as Adams indicates, “is rooted in the call of Jesus Christ who, faced with the news of the imprisonment of John, begins his ministry proclaiming and living out the good news of the kingdom of God” (xxxii).  As Adams reminds Christians:  “In the face of death, we are called to witness to life, to unity in the face of division, to hope in the face of fear, to love in the face of hate because we are the body of Christ” (xxxii).

References

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Bergeron, Claire.  Going to the Back of the Line:  A Primer on Lines, Visa Categories,        and Wait Times.  Washington, DC:  Migration Policy Institute, 2013.  Print.

Budde, Michael L.  The Borders of Baptism:  Identities, Allegiances, and the Church.  Eugene:  Cascade Books, 2011.  Print.

Carroll R., M. Daniel.  Christians at the Border:  Immigration, the Church, and the Bible.  2^nd ed Grand Rapids:  Brazos Press, 2013.  Print.

Cavanaugh, William T.  Migrations of the Holy:  God, State, and the Political Meaning of the Church.  Grand Rapids:  Wm. B Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2011.  Print.

Daniel, Ben.  Neighbor:  Christian Encounters with “Illegal” Immigration.  Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2010.  Print.

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Slattery, Joseph.    The Suffering Faces of the Poor Are the Suffering Faces of Christ.  Tulsa, OK:  Diocese of Tulsa.  2007.  Print.

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“The Impact of Illegal Immigration on the Wages and Employment Opportunities of Black Workers:  A Briefing Before The United States Commission on Civil Rights Held in Washington, DC.”  The United States Commission on Civil Rights.  15 January 2010.  Print.

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